Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Declassified on: 201505

Sir - Notes for MNC-I BUA, 15 Nov 07:

LTG Odierno's comments:

- During Media update, re: AP story about a Sunni Sheik who claimed
 US forces killed his men LTG Odierno said he needs the MNDs to
 help on this. Does anybody have this Sheik [article reports the name
 as Mansour Abid Salim of the Taji Awakening Council] as a CLC
 leader? I need you to jump on this, it is an IO problem. MND-N, MND-B and MNF-W let's figure out what happened. I have been waiting for
 36 hours for some resolution and I want a definitive answer tonight.
- During MNF-W update LTG Odierno said, "Great job with the POE. I do think it's a big deal with the POE, so thanks."
- During MND-B update, re: Pegasus 5 acknowledged requirement for feedback on Sunni Sheik media report – LTG Odierno said to include the clearing procedure as you walk your way through it.
- Post-BUA comments BG Anderson said MND-B, MND-N work through the CLC contract and target clearance issue through the JOC.

C2 Ops

- Insurgent group targeting of ISF.
- In recent weeks, despite an overall decrease in attacks across the ITO generally and specifically against ISF, there are multiple instances of insurgent groups recently targeting ISF and their leadership in several MNDs.
- The number of IPs murdered in Mosul increased during the month of October against the backdrop of decreased attacks locally. While analysis indicates attack levels in the city are cyclic in general, this increase also coincides with amplified AQI operations and activity in the region. Mosul is on a key facilitation route, AQI is shifting operations, seeking to gain a permissive operating environment. In late Oct 07, AQI ambushed Iraqi Police Deputy Lieutenant Colonel Mahmud Ali Haybi, killing him. Several days later, AQI assassinated one of Haybi's bodyguards and his family. On 03 Nov, an IED detonated on the convoy of Gen. Ayad, the 5/4 IA BDE Commander, in Kirkuk. There were no casualties and one IA vehicle was damaged. On 07 Nov, MND-North reported an IED detonation in Kirkuk, which targeted the convoy of Gen Borhan, the Kirkuk Chief of Police.
- In MND-Baghdad, reporting suggests that the targeting focus of many criminal JAM elements and Shi'a extremists is shifting towards ISF leadership, particularly the deliberate assassination of key ISF leadership. On 04 Nov, an IED exploded near the headquarters of a National Police Major General in the Al Mansour District of Baghdad, wounding six, but did not injure the general.
- On 03 Nov in Basrah a convoy containing PDOP MG Jallil, BOC Commander GEN Mohan, and BG Hammed was targeted by an IED.
 None of the generals were injured, though two bodyguards were wounded


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and a vehicle damaged. On 07 Nov, an IED attack in Basra targeted the convoy carrying MG Jallil. The general was unharmed but four Iraqi Police (IP) were wounded. This was the seventh attack against MG Jallil and MND-Southeast assesses that such attacks are expected to continue while he continues efforts to reform IPS.

IED attacks against senior ISF leadership will continue as insurgents seek
to reduce ISF effectiveness through the precise targeting of key personnel
judged responsible for recent ISF successes. Although not all recent
attacks have resulted in the death of the intended targets, they are likely
seen as useful intimidation tactics, though in most instances, these attacks
harden the resolve of the ISF leaders. Additionally, corrupt elements within
the ISF see leaders such as MG Jalil to be an impediment to their
activities, and may target them for reasons related to criminal, in addition
to insurgent activity. Increased ISF successes and growing numbers of
trained ISF personnel will lead to further targeting of leaders seen as
critical to ISF effectiveness.

COIC IED Summary


• IED and AAIED attacks preceding and following Al Sadr's order to JAM to cease attacks on Coalition Forces.



- During the two weeks preceding the 29 AUG announcement, AAIED attacks were occurring at a daily average of 2.5 events per day. Since the announcement, attacks have been occurring at a daily rate of 1.5 events per day. There have been 25 AAIED attacks to date in November, with monthly projections in the mid 50s, much like September and October. Found and Cleared rates for this type of IED remain high, at approximately 40% this month. There was 1 AAIED attacks since Monday's BUA, which detonated in Karkh and resulted in 1x KIA and 5x WIA.
- The second slide depicts all IED attacks in Shia areas, or that are attributed to irreconcilable Shia extremists. During the two weeks prior to the announcement, attacks were occurring at a daily average of 10.3.
 Since then, IED attacks have occurred at a daily rate of approximately 7.5.



IEDs in Predominantly Shia Areas 15 - 29 Aug 07 and 30 Aug 07 - 14 Nov 0



 We assess that some JAM Special Groups are still actively targeting Coalition Forces within Baghdad with sustained AAIED attacks, despite supply and leadership losses over the past month.

CCIRs reported to MNC-I for the previous 24 hour period are shown below.

- To view report details, go to the MNC-I SIGACTS rollup page at <u>MNC-I</u> <u>CCIR/SIGACT Roll-up</u>.
- See MNC-I CCIR storyboards at MNC-I CCIR Storyboards.

MND-B



151140C Nov 07 : 20071115114038SMB3736483580 : (FRIENDLY ACTION) ESCALATION OF FORCE RPT 3-1 MECH NPTT : 1 CIV WIA

000

: Enemy

CF

000

1

: Host Nation

000

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
MND-C

 CCI
 R
 150127C Nov 07 : 20071114213338SMB1419069900 : (FRIENDLY FIRE) NONE SELECTED RPT

 SCT/1-187(WHITE ON BLUE) : 0 INJ/DAM

 Casualties : Enemy
 0 0 0 0 : CF
 0 0 0 0 : CIV
 0 0 0 0 : Host Nation
 0 0 0

MND-N



MNF-W-None

MND-SE - None

MND-CS - None

MND-NE - None

VR

(b)(3), (b)(6) MND-B LNO